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The concept of free will is hard to define, but crucial to both individual and social
life. For centuries people have wondered how freedom is possible in a world ruled by
physical determinism; however, reflections on free will have been confined to philosophy
until half a century ago, when the topic was also addressed by neuroscience. The
first relevant, and now well-known, strand of research on the brain correlates of
free will was that pioneered by Libet et al. (1983), which focused on the allegedly
unconscious intentions taking place in decisions regarded as free and voluntary. Libet’s
interpretation of the so-called readiness potential (RP) seems to favor a sort of deflation
of freedom (Soon et al., 2008). However, recent studies seem to point to a different
interpretation of the RP, namely that the apparent build-up of the brain activity preceding
subjectively spontaneous voluntary movements (SVM) may reflect the ebb and flow
of the background neuronal noise, which is triggered by many factors (Schurger
et al., 2016). This interpretation seems to bridge the gap between the neuroscientific
perspective on free will and the intuitive, commonsensical view of it (Roskies, 2010b), but
many problems remain to be solved and other theoretical paths can be hypothesized.
The article therefore, proposes to start from an operationalizable concept of free will
(Lavazza and Inglese, 2015) to find a connection between higher order descriptions
(useful for practical life) and neural bases. This new way to conceptualize free will
should be linked to the idea of “capacity”: that is, the availability of a repertoire of
general skills that can be manifested and used without moment by moment conscious
control. The capacity index, which is also able to take into account the differences
of time scales in decisions, includes reasons-responsiveness and is related to internal
control, understood as the agent’s ownership of the mechanisms that trigger the
relevant behavior. Cognitive abilities, needed for one to have capacity, might be
firstly operationalized as a set of neuropsychological tests, which can be used to
operationalize and measure specific executive functions, as they are strongly linked to
the concept of control. Subsequently, a free will index would allow for the search of the
underlying neural correlates of the capacity exhibited by people and the limits in capacity
exhibited by each individual.
Keywords: readiness potential, unconscious decision, choice prediction, stochastic processes, measurement
of freedom, evidence accumulation
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INTRODUCTION—FREE WILL AS A
PROBLEM (NOT ONLY) FOR SCIENCE
The concept of free will is hard to define, but crucial to both
individual and social life (Kane, 2005). Free will can be the
reason why someone is not sent to jail during a trial upon
appealing to insanity: the subject was not ‘‘free’’ when they
committed the crime, not because someone was pointing a gun
to their head, but because a psychiatric illness prevented them
from controlling their actions. According to a long-standing
philosophical tradition, if someone was not ‘‘free’’ when they
did something, they cannot be held responsible for their deed
(Glannon, 2015). And the freedom in question is both ‘‘social’’
freedom (linked to constraints imposed by our peers or by
external factors), and the one indicated by the term free will.
Free will can be defined by three conditions (Walter, 2001).
The first one is the ‘‘ability to do otherwise.’’ This is an intuitive
concept: to be free, one has to have at least two alternatives
or courses of action between which to choose. If one has an
involuntary spasm of the mouth, for example, one is not in the
position to choose whether to twist one’s mouth or not. The
second condition is the ‘‘control over one’s choices.’’ The person
who acts must be the same who decides what to do. To be granted
free will, one must be the author of one’s choices, without the
interference of people and of mechanisms outside of one’s reach.
This is what we call agency, that is, being and feeling like the
‘‘owner’’ of one’s decisions and actions. The third condition is
the ‘‘responsiveness to reasons’’: a decision can’t be free if it is the
effect of a random choice, but it must be rationally motivated.
If I roll a dice to decide whom to marry, my choice cannot
be said to be free, even though I will freely choose to say ‘‘I
do’’. On the contrary, if I choose to marry a specific person for
their ideas and my deep love for them, then my decision will be
free.
Thus defined, free will is a kind of freedom that we are
willing to attribute to all human beings as a default condition.
Of course there are exceptions: people suffering from mental
illness and people under psychotropic substances (Levy, 2013).
Nevertheless, the attribution of free will as a general trend
does not imply that all decisions are always taken in full
freedom, as outlined by the three conditions illustrated above:
‘‘We often act on impulse, against our interests, without being
fully aware of what we are doing. But this does not imply
that we are not potentially able to act freely. Ethics and
law have incorporated these notions, adopting the belief that
usually people are free to act or not to act in a certain way
and that, as a result, they are responsible for what they do,
with the exceptions mentioned above’’ (Lavazza and Inglese,
2015).
It is commonly experienced that the conditions of ‘‘ability
to do otherwise’’, ‘‘control’’ and ‘‘responsiveness to reasons’’ are
very rarely at work all at once. Moreover, they would require
further discussion, because there is wide disagreement on
those conditions as regards their definition and scope (Kane,
2016). But for the purposes of this article, this introductory
treatment should suffice. In fact, the description of free will that
I have sketched here is the one that dominated the theoretical
discourse on, and practical applications of, the evaluation of
human actions. From a philosophical point of view, however,
starting with Plato, the main problem has been that of the
actual existence of freedom, beyond the appearances and
the insights that guide our daily life. The main challenge
to free will has been determinism: the view that everything
that happens (human decisions and actions included) is
the consequence of sufficient conditions for its occurrence
(Berofsky, 2011). More specifically, ‘‘It is the argument
that all mental phenomena and actions are also, directly or
indirectly, causally produced—according to the laws of nature
(such as those of physics and neurobiology)—by previous
events that lie beyond the control of the agents’’ (Lavazza
and Inglese, 2015). Determinism was first a philosophical
position; then, the birth of Galilean science—founded
on the existence of immutable laws that are empirically
verifiable—has increased its strength, giving rise to the
concept of incompatibilism, namely the idea that free will
and natural determinism cannot coexist. Only one of them can
be true.
Throughout the centuries, despite its conceptual progress,
philosophy hasn’t been able to solve this dilemma. As a
result, today there are different irreconcilable positions about
human free will: determinism is not absolute and free will
exists; free will does not exist for a number of reasons, first
of all (but not only) determinism; free will can exist even
if determinism is true (Kane, 2011). A little more than 30
years ago, neuroscience and empirical psychology came into
play. Although biological processes cannot be considered strictly
deterministic on the observable level of brain functioning (nerve
signal transmission), new methods of investigation of the brain,
more andmore precise, have established that the cerebral base is a
necessary condition of behavior and even of mental phenomena.
On the basis of these acquisitions, neuroscience has begun
to provide experimental contributions to the debate on free
will.
In order to better understand the neural bases of free will,
provided that there are any, in this article I’ll review and
integrate findings from studies in different fields (philosophy,
cognitive neuroscience, experimental and clinical psychology,
neuropsychology). Unlike previous reviews on free will and
neuroscience (Haggard, 2008, 2009; Passingham et al., 2010;
Roskies, 2010a; Brass et al., 2013), I have no claim of being
exhaustive. My goal is to highlight a paradigm shift in the analysis
and interpretation of the brain determinants preceding and/or
causing free or voluntary action (Haggard, 2008 takes voluntary
decision to be non-stimulus driven, as much as possible). Firstly,
following Libet’s experiments, a widespread interpretation of
the so-called readiness potential (RP) went in the direction of
a deflation of freedom (Crick, 1994; Greene and Cohen, 2004;
Cashmore, 2010; Harris, 2012). Indeed, the discovery of the role
of the RP has been taken as evidence of the fact that free will is an
illusion, since it seems that specific brain areas activate before we
are aware of the onset of the movement. However, recent studies
seem to point to a different interpretation of the RP, namely that
the apparent build-up of the brain activity preceding subjectively
spontaneous voluntary movements (SVM) may reflect the ebb
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and flow of the background neuronal noise, which is triggered
by many factors (Schurger et al., 2016). This interpretation seems
to bridge, at least partially, the gap between the neuroscientific
perspective on free will and the intuitive, commonsensical view
of it (Roskies, 2010b), but many problems remain to be solved
and other theoretical paths can be hypothesized. After analyzing
the change of paradigm of these perspectives, I’ll propose to
start from an operationalizable concept of free will (Lavazza
and Inglese, 2015) to find a connection between higher order
descriptions (useful for practical life) and neural bases.
NEUROSCIENCE: PURPORTING TO
EXPLAIN FREE WILL
The Discovery of the Readiness Potential
As a preliminary consideration, it is important to underline that
the idea of using an experiment (or a series of experiments)
to establish whether the human being can be said to have free
will implies accepting a direct link between a measurement of
brain functioning and a pre-existing theoretical construct. This
direct connection, as it is known, presents several problems
and as we shall see, needs conceptual refinement to avoid
simplifications and unfounded claims. What one can see and
measure in brain activity may in fact only grasp a part of
the idea of free will that we would like to test. This was
one of the main criticisms to the experiments conducted
so far (Mele, 2009; Nachev and Hacker, 2014). What is
measured at the level of brain functioning in the laboratory
does not match the concept of free will we refer to, for
example, to determine whether someone who engaged in
violent behavior could have done otherwise in that specific
circumstance.
The first relevant, and now well-known, strand of research
on the brain correlates of free will was that pioneered by
Libet et al. (1983), which focused on the allegedly unconscious
intentions affecting decisions regarded as free and voluntary.
It should be noted that the concepts involved—‘‘conscious
intentions’’, ‘‘voluntary decisions’’, ‘‘free decisions’’—have no
clear and shared definition (Nachev and Hacker, 2014), and the
experiments themselves have been differently interpreted and
often criticized (Lavazza and De Caro, 2010). In any case, Libet’s
experiments and their variants have been repeated several times
until very recently, confirming their findings with a sufficient
degree of reliability.
Libet based his work on Kornhuber and Deecke’s (1965)
discovery of the bereitschaftpotential: the RP, a slow build-up
of a scalp electrical potential (of a few microvolts), mainly
measured through electroencephalography (EEG), that precedes
the onset of subjectively SVM (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965).
According to its discoverers, the RP is ‘‘the electro-physiological
sign of planning, preparation, and initiation of volitional
acts’’ (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1990). ‘‘The neurobiologist John
Eccles speculated that the subject must become conscious
of the intention to act before the onset of this RP. Libet
had the idea that he should test Eccles’s prediction’’ (Doyle,
2011).
In his experiments, Libet invited the participants to move
their right wrist and to report the precise moment when they
had the impression that they decided to do so, thanks to a big
clock they had in front of them (Libet et al., 1983). In this
way, it was possible to estimate the time of awareness with
respect to the beginning of the movement, measured using
an electromyogram (which records the muscle contraction).
During the execution of the task, brain electrical activity was
recorded through electrodes placed on the participants’ scalps.
The attention was focused on a specific negative brain potential,
namely the RP, originated from the supplementary motor area
(SMA): a brain area involved in motor preparation, which is
visible in the EEG signal as a wave that starts before any voluntary
movement, while being absent or reduced before involuntary and
automatic movements.
When one compares the subjective ‘‘time’’ of decision
and what appeared at a cerebral level, the result appears as
a striking blow to the traditional view of free will (Libet,
1985, 2004). In the experiment, the RP culminating in the
execution of the movement starts in the prefrontal motor areas
long before the time when the subject seems to have made
the decision: participants became aware of their intention to
take action about 350 ms after the onset of such potential.
The volitional process is detected to start unconsciously 550 ms
before the action is made in the case of non-preplanned acts
and 1000 ms before in the case of preplanned acts. Thus
these findings seem to show that our simple actions (and
therefore, potentially, also more complex ones) are triggered
by unconscious neural activity and that the awareness of those
actions only occurs at a later time, when we think we are willing
to act.
In the first phase of its intervention in the debate on
free will, therefore, neuroscience seemed to argue for a
deflation of freedom. Neuroscientists identified a specific
aspect of the notion of freedom (the conscious control of
the start of the action) and researched it: the experimental
results seemed to indicate that there is no such conscious
control, hence the conclusion that free will does not exist.
However, it is important to highlight that this interpretation
strongly depends on the idea that free choices or actions
are fully internally generated, in the sense that they are not
externally determined—where ‘‘external’’ means outside the
subject’s conscience and the subject is something akin to the
self. As we shall see, though, this distinction seems to be neither
relevant nor truly informative when considering if and how
choices are free.
In fact, Libet left the subject some time to veto: about 150
ms. This is the time needed for the muscles to flex in response
to the command of the primary motor cortex (M2) through
the spinal motor nerve cells. In the last 50 ms the action is
realized with its external manifestations (bending the wrist)
without any more possible intervention by the prefrontal brain
areas (see ‘‘The Veto Power’’ Section). Libet thought there was
a role for conscious will precisely in this situation: conscious
will can let the action go to completion or it can block it
with the explicit veto of the movement implemented by the
prefrontal areas (Doyle, 2011). But the intentional inhibition of
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 262
Lavazza Free Will and Neuroscience
an action (a decision itself) is preceded by neural activity as
well (Filevich et al., 2012, 2013). So it cannot be a completely
different decision from that to take a positive decision to
act.
In their experiments, Haggard and Eimer (1999) used Libet’s
method, but asked the participants to perform a different task.
They had to move at will either the right index finger or the
left in a series of repeated trials. The authors have compared
the RP and the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) in trials
in which awareness appeared in shorter or longer time, that
is, considering the latency of awareness compared to the RP.
In their words, ‘‘the RP tended to occur later on trials with
early awareness of movement initiation than on trials with late
awareness, ruling out the RP as a cause of our awareness of
movement initiation. However, the LRP occurred significantly
earlier on trials with early awareness than on trials with late
awareness, suggesting that the processes underlying the LRP
may cause our awareness of movement initiation’’ (Haggard and
Eimer, 1999). From this, one can deduce that the awareness
of the intention to move one finger or the other comes after
the decision was ‘‘taken by the brain’’, as reflected in the
LRP.
Sirigu et al. (2004) and Desmurget et al. (2009) have shown
that, repeating Libet’s experiments on patients with parietal
lesions, it appears that they become aware of their decision to
take action only when the action itself is being carried out. In
these subjects the awareness of the decision does not even come
before the beginning of the movement, as it tends to coincide
with the motor action. It seems that in such cases the brain
alteration has reduced, if not cancelled altogether, the interval
of consciousness preceding the actual implementation of the
action. The authors proposed that when a movement is planned,
activity in the parietal cortex, as part of a cortical sensorimotor
processing loop, generates a predictive internal model of the
upcoming movement. And this model might form the neural
correlate of motor awareness.
Fried et al. (2011) recorded the activity of 1019 neurons as 12
subjects performed self-initiated finger movements. They found
progressive neuronal recruitment, particularly in the SMA, over
1500 ms before subjects reported making the decision to move.
A population of 256 SMA neurons was sufficient to predict in
single trials the impending decision to move: 700 ms before
the participants became aware of the decision, the accuracy of
the prevision was higher than 80%. Fried et al. (2011) were also
able to predict, ‘‘with a precision of a few 100 ms, the time point
of that voluntary decision to move’’, and they implemented a
computational model thanks to which ‘‘volition emerged when
a change in the internally generated firing rate of neuronal
assemblies crossed a certain threshold’’.
Unreliability of the Conscious Intention
A slightly different trend of research compared to Libet’s
comprises studies suggesting that the conscious intention of
an action is strongly influenced by events that occur after the
action itself was performed. In this sense, intentions are therefore
partially reconstructed according to a process of inference, based
on elements that come after the action. For instance, a study
by Lau et al. (2006) has produced results that empirically
support this hypothesis. The authors have used transcranic
magnetic stimulation (TMS) on the pre-supplementary motor
(pre-SM) area, while the subjects were performing Libet’s
task. The stimulation of the pre-SM through TMS happened
at different time intervals, in relation to a simple voluntary
movement. When the stimulation was applied 200 ms after
the movement, the judgment W was moved back in time,
indicating that the perception of the intention was influenced
by the neural activity of the pre-SM after the motor action
was made (cf. also Lau et al., 2004; Lau and Passingham,
2007).
In another experiment, Banks and Isham (2009) have set a
slightly different version of Libet’s task: participants were asked
to push a button whenever they wanted, and later they had
to indicate the precise moment when they had the intention
to do so. When they pushed the button, subject received an
auditory feedback with a delay from 5 to 60 ms, so as to give
them the impression that the response happened after they
pushed the button. Even though the subjects weren’t aware of
the delay between the action and the auditory feedback, the
intention to press the button was reported as happening later
in time, according to a linear function with the delay of the
auditory signal feedback. The identification of the moment in
which the subject had intended to press the button—measured by
judgment W—was therefore largely determined by the apparent
time of the subject’s response, and not the actual answer.
This result indicates that the people evaluate the time when
they have had the intention to take an action based on the
consequences of their action and not just on the motor action
itself.
Kühn and Brass (2009) conducted an experiment combining
the paradigm of the stop signal (Logan et al., 1984) with an
intentional action paradigm. The subjects had to react in the
quickest possible way by pushing a button as soon as a stimulus
(e. g., a letter) was displayed at the center of a computer screen.
Sometimes, just after the presentation of the stimulus, either a
stop signal or a decision signal was shown: in the first case, the
subjects had to try to stop responding; in the second case they
could decide whether to press the button or stop responding. In
the decision trials in which subjects had provided an answer, the
subjects were asked if it had actually been the result of a decision,
or if it had been inhibited—that is, if they had not been able to
stop before the decision signal was presented.
The results have shown that in some instances, the
subjects judged as intentional responses—i.e., as the result
of a decision—those answers that in reality, on the basis
of reaction times, were failed inhibitions. In other words,
sometimes the subjects had a subjective experience of having
intentionally decided to perform an action that they had
actually not decided to take. These studies have empirically
supported the hypothesis that the intentions to take voluntary
actions are strongly influenced by events occurring after
the execution of the action. In addition, they seem to
confirm that the brain motor system produces a movement
as the final result of its inputs and outputs; consciousness
would be ‘‘informed’’ of the fact that a movement is
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going to occur and this would produce the subjective
perception that the movement was decided voluntarily (Hallett,
2007).
Predicting Choices
More recently, studying the activity of the frontal and parietal
cortex, other neuroscientists of the group coordinated by
Soon et al. (2008, 2013) have managed to detect the ‘‘rise’’
of a behavioral or abstract choice/decision (to move either
the right finger or the left one; to perform a mathematical
operation or another with two numbers) a few seconds
before the subject becomes aware of it. An unconscious
brain process has already ‘‘decided’’ what to do when the
subject still does not know what she would choose and
thinks she still has the power to decide. More precisely,
Soon et al. (2008) studied ‘‘free decisions’’ between many
behavioral options using the multivariate pattern classification
analysis (MVPA) which, combined with fMRI, allows one to
identify specific contents of cognitive processes. ‘‘A pattern
classifier, usually adopted from machine learning, can be trained
on exemplars of neural patterns acquired when participants
make different decisions and can learn to distinguish between
these. If the activation patterns contain information about the
decisions, the trained classifier can then successfully predict
decision outcomes from independent data’’ (Bode et al.,
2014).
In Soon et al.’s (2008) experiment, subjects carried out a
freely paced motor-decision task (choosing to press a button
with either the left or the right index finger) while their brain
activity was being measured using fMRI. The subjects then
had to report the moment of the decision, not by using a
clock as in Libet’s experiment, but by selecting a letter in a
stream that was being presented during the task. Soon et al.
(2008) used fMRI signals to find local neural patterns and
draw from such patterns all possible information decoded
second by second thanks to the statistical techniques of pattern
recognition. The brain areas that were mostly involved in the
performance of the actions are the primary M2 and the SMA,
while two other brain regions encoded the subject’s motor
decision ahead of time and with high accuracy. Indeed, the
frontopolar cortex (BA10) and a portion of the cingulate cortex
can be monitored to understand what kind of choice will
be made by the person before they are conscious of having
taken a specific decision in the task they were given. The
prediction can be made, with a relevant approximation (60%
mean accuracy), up to 7 s before the conscious choice is
experienced by the subject, thanks to the fMRI signals detected
in the BA10 (one should take into account that the subjects
are asked to think hard about the choice before making it,
whereas usually simple choices do not require long subjective
reflection). ‘‘The temporal ordering of information suggests a
tentative causal model of information flow, where the earliest
unconscious precursors of the motor decision originated in
frontopolar cortex, from where they influenced the buildup of
decision-related information in the precuneus and later in SMA,
where it remained unconscious for up to 10 s’’ (Soon et al.,
2008).
This seems to revive the old issue of God’s foreknowledge that
forced theologians to wonder if man can be considered free, if
someone already knows his future choices. Indeed, the authors
speak of ‘‘free’’ decisions determined by brain activity ahead of
time by placing ‘‘free’’ between inverted commas, as freedom
is taken to be a commonsensical hypothesis. In this regard, the
authors claim: ‘‘we found that the outcome of a decision can be
encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to
10 s before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects
the operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin
to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness’’
(Soon et al., 2008).
Another interesting study is that conducted by Alexander
et al. (2016): using a new experimental design, it found that
the RP also occurs in the absence of movement. It suggests
that ‘‘the RP measured here is unlikely to reflect preconscious
motor planning or preparation of an ensuing movement, and
instead may reflect decision-related or anticipatory processes
that are non-motoric in nature’’ (Alexander et al., 2016). The
experimental design used a modified version of Libet’s task.
Subjects had to choose between four letters whenever they
wanted, by taking note of the exact moment of their choice. Later,
in half the trials, the subjects had to push a button as soon as they
made the decision, whereas in the other half subjects had to do
nothing to mark their choice. At the end of the task, all subjects
had to report when they had made their decision. In this way, by
EEG, electrooculography (EOG) and electromyography (EMG),
it was possible to see the RP of the decision-making both inmotor
and non-motor contexts.
The authors did not find any strong differences between
the two RPs, thereby affirming that there is a pure cognitive
contribution to RP that does not reflect processes related to
movement. They thus suggest that cognitive RP might reflect
action preparation, general anticipation and spontaneous neural
fluctuations. Interestingly, they exclude that the RP reflects
action preparation since it is a non-motor processing. And as
to anticipation they cannot exclude that RP may be specifically
associated with free choice. So the RP could merely reflect the
average of spontaneous fluctuations (see ‘‘Other Neuroscientific
Hypotheses on Free Will’’ Section).
FREE WILL AS AN ILLUSION
All these experiments seem to indicate that free will is an illusion.
Yet, these relevant experiments can be interpreted in many
ways. A possible view is that, in some way, determinism can be
observed directly within ourselves. This interpretationmight lead
to the conclusion that free will is just an illusion. In fact, if one
considers as a condition of free will the fact that it should be causa
sui (i.e., it should be able to consciously start new causal chains),
such a condition is incompatible with determinism as it is usually
defined. For it, in fact, all events are linked by casual relations in
the form of natural laws, which started long before we were born
and which we cannot escape.
However, determinism has generally been regarded as a
metaphysical claim, not refutable by empirical findings. One
could properly talk of automatism in the brain, not of
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 262
Lavazza Free Will and Neuroscience
determinism, based on the evidence available. (In any case,
endorsing indeterminism might lead to consider our behavior
as the causal product of choices that every time produce
different results, as if we rolled a dice. This doesn’t seem
to make us any freer than if determinism were overturned;
cf. Levy, 2011). Most importantly, another feature of freedom
seems to be a pure illusion, namely the role of consciousness.
The experiments considered thus far heavily question the
claim that consciousness actually causes voluntary behavior.
Neural activation starts the decisional process culminating
in the movement, while consciousness ‘‘comes after’’, when
‘‘things are done’’. Therefore, consciousness cannot trigger our
voluntary decisions. But the role of consciousness in voluntary
choices is part of the definition of free will (but the very
definition of consciousness is a matter of debate, cf. Chalmers,
1996).
Empirical research in psychology also shows that our mind
works and makes choices without our conscious control. As
proposed by psychologist Wegner (2002, 2003, 2004) and
Aarts et al. (2004), we are ‘‘built’’ to have the impression
to consciously control our actions or to have the power
to freely choose, even though all that is only a cognitive
illusion. Many priming experiments show that people act
‘‘mechanically’’ (even when their behavior might appear suited
to the environment and even refined). Automatic cognitive
processes, of which we aren’t always aware, originate our
decisions, and they were only discovered thanks to the most
advanced scientific research. Ultimately, consciousness, which
should exercise control and assess the reasons for a choice,
is thus allegedly causally ineffective: a mere epiphenomenon,
to use the terminology of the philosophy of mind. This
is what has been called Zombie Challenge, ‘‘based on an
amazing wealth of findings in recent cognitive science that
demonstrate the surprising ways in which our everyday
behavior is controlled by automatic processes that unfold
in the complete absence of consciousness’’ (Vierkant et al.,
2013).
These experiments have triggered a huge debate and led
scientists, philosophers and intellectuals to claim (or insist even
more, if they already denied free will) that free will doesn’t exist
(Greene and Cohen, 2004; Cashmore, 2010; Harris, 2012). It
seemed as though neuroscience had produced empirical evidence
against free will, so that the century-long debate on it could
be considered solved. However, Libet’s experiments have been
also criticized. Much criticism was directed to the philosophical
interpretation of these studies (Mele, 2014) or to their theoretical
assumptions (Nachev and Hacker, 2014), which are important
but not relevant here. Among the forms of criticism, one has to
mention the theories of action that separate the deciding from
the initiating (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006).
In that case, free and conscious deliberating could still have a
relevant casual role, long before the actual performance of the
action.
Other objections, more markedly neuroscientific, were made
for instance by Trevena and Miller (2010). They argued that
the RP is not an intention to move, but only indicates that
an attentional process is in place in the brain, since when
subjects ‘‘attended to their intention rather than their movement,
there was an enhancement of activity in the pre-SMA’’ (Lau
et al., 2004). In any case, ‘‘there was no evidence of stronger
electrophysiological signs before a decision to move than before
a decision not to move, so these signs clearly are not specific
to movement preparation’’, (Trevena and Miller, 2010). Others
have noted that the introspective estimates of event timing
are disputable or inaccurate, and measures in general are not
sufficiently exact (Dennett, 1984a,b, 2003).
MORE THAN EXPLAINING AWAY
Other studies using multivariate pattern analysis with EEG
confirmed that the subjectively free decisions might be made in
the brain in the same way as evidence-based perceptual decisions
(Bode et al., 2012a,b, 2013). Indeed, Bode et al. (2012b) wrote,
we directly decoded choice-predictive information from neural
activity before stimulus presentation on pure noise trials on which
no discriminative information was present. Choice behavior
on these trials was shown to be primed by the recent choice
history. Modelling of sequential effects in RT and accuracy
confirmed that such choice priming biased the starting point of a
diffusion process toward a decision boundary, as conceptualized
in evidence accumulation models of perceptual decision making
(Bode et al., 2012b).
In other words, the authors found that internally (and maybe
stochastically) generated neural activity can bias decisions that
are expected to be stimulus-responsive or (possibly) reason-
responsive. In this case, as in others that I will consider below, the
understanding that we begin to have of the neuronal processes
in play shows us that there is a complexity of factors at work.
Some of these factors seem to be genuinely random, due to
the pure noise produced by the default brain activity, while
other factors can be traced back to the previous history of
decisions taken in similar situations or related to the present one.
Therefore, there is no ‘‘mysterious’’ start of the action as a linear
process that, from the initial command, is then executed, as in
Libet’s simplified model. Rather, this outcome is the result of
a multiplicity of causal elements, which are homogeneous from
the viewpoint of proximal mechanisms but of different relevance
from the viewpoint of interpretation in terms of intentional
psychology.
Another study has shown that attempts to account for (make
sense of) insufficient perceptive clues use the same neural
networks as those involved in ‘‘free’’ decision-making (Bode
et al., 2013). An fMRI-based pattern classifier can be trained
to differentiate between different perceptual guesses and try to
predict the outcome of non-perceptual decisions, like those made
by the participants in the experiments considered so far. Specific
activation patterns detected in the medial posterior parietal
cortex have allowed the authors to make correct predictions on
the participants’ free choices based on the previously decoded
perceptual guesses decoded, and the other way round.
The task was the following: the participants were given a
masked stimulus and had to say what category the stimulus
belonged to. They had to freely choose among many categories.
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Thanks to the multivariate pattern analysis it was possible to
identify the model of ‘‘free decisions’’ to make correct predictions
in the context of perceptual judgments and identify the model
of the ‘‘guess decisions’’, to make correct predictions in the
context of ‘‘free decisions’’. It thus seems that a similar neural
code for both types of decision is present. In those cases one
could say that guessing is similar to making a free decision,
since the brain, in the absence of sufficient external cues, has to
decide internally. So perceptual decisions can be predicted from
specific preceding neural activity when the brain doesn’t have
enough internal elements to reach the threshold of perceptive
decision.
Studies and commentaries have nevertheless drawn attention
to possible confounds and bias in those experiments, namely
they might be affected by previous choices with a form
of auto-correlation in spontaneous decisions. In particular,
Lages and Jaworska (2012) ‘‘trained a linear classifier to
predict ‘‘spontaneous decisions’’ and ‘‘hidden intentions’’ from
responses in preceding trials and achieved comparable prediction
accuracies as reported for multivariate pattern classification
based on voxel activities in frontopolar cortex’’. Lages et al.
(2013) have stressed a possible sequential information processing
between trials that can introduce a confound, and recommended
that ‘‘rather postulating a 50% chance level, prediction
should be tested with a permutation test and/or separate
multivariate classification analyses conditional on the previous
response’’.
The prediction of perceptual decisions from specific
preceding neural activity is linked to what is defined ‘‘evidence
accumulator model for free choice’’ (Bode et al., 2014). The
explanation starts with the fact that predictive activation patterns
preceding decisions become increasingly similar to the patterns
detected when the decision is consciously experienced by the
subject. This could mean that a slow build-up of decision-related
activity occurs, as it happens in accumulation of decision-related
evidence to a decision threshold (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff and
McKoon, 2008). Also, as already noted, when no external
feedback is available, the previous choice is used as external
feedback (Akaishi et al., 2014). The history of previous decisions
has a systematic effect on subsequent choices, related to the
activity in medial posterior parietal cortex/posterior and
posterior cingulate cortex (Bode et al., 2011, 2013). And the
systematic effect can go in the direction of repetition or of
avoidance of repetition depending on the task (Mochizuki and
Funahashi, 2014).
Here is an important point that deserves study from
the neuroscientific point of view but also from that of a
philosophical interpretation of free will. It consists in the
fact that the internally generated brain activity has to do
both with the stochastic noise and with the history of the
subject’s choices. On the one hand, the stochastic noise comes
both from the configuration that the brain has on average
as a result of evolution (adaptive significance) and from
individual development, resulting from random processes and
environmental influences. On the other hand, the history of the
choices is derived from the same process (in part stochastic) that
I have just described.
In any case, if (at least some) very short-term decisions have a
genesis similar to that described here, these decisions contribute
to shaping the brain activity, and then, presumably, also to
influencing decisions on a longer time scale that it is not yet
possible to investigate experimentally. Ultimately, this could
mean that there is a confluence of causal factors at the level of
microdecisions. These factors add up in a way that it is hardly
possible to tackle for current science. Then also the reasons
motivating an action, typical of free actions, such as ‘‘I punched
the stalker because it is right to punish those who behave in this
way and because I wanted to set an example for all’’, encoded in
neural activity, can be part of the sum of neural causes.
In fact, experimental psychology has been trying to take into
account long-term influences. In the so-called marshmallow
experiment, researchers focused on delayed gratification
(Mischel et al., 1972, 1989). A child was given a choice between
one small, immediate reward and two small rewards (i. e. a
larger reward) if they were able to wait some minutes while the
psychologist left the room and then came back. Children who
waited longer for the their rewards tended to have better life
outcomes and accomplishments. Such experiments are relevant
in terms of explanations and predictions, but it seems hard to
trace behavioral profiles back to specific profiles of cerebral
activation, once we are aware of the complexity of causal chains
in the evidence accumulation model.
As Bode et al. (2014) write, in the hypothesis of an evidence
accumulator that collects sensory evidence until a decision
threshold is reached,
task instructions, participants’ internal motivation, and previous
choices all have a strong influence on how decision tasks are
performed when external information is either unavailable (as in
free decisions), or unhelpful (as in perceptual guessing). In the
case of free decision tasks, fluctuating intention for one or the
other option may result from active competition between neural
representations of both options in decision networks (or rather
although not consciously monitored by the participants, the
previous choice history, embodied in dynamic states of decision
networks, can become the primary determinant of behavior,
simply because nothing else is available (Bode et al., 2014).
However, in this way things get more complicated and at
a macroscopic level of behavioral observation, this blurs but
doesn’t do away with the idea of free behaviors and behaviors that
could be taken as unconscious decisions, of which we become
aware only when the action has been performed. What remains
to be solved is the problem of the distinction between external
stimuli that trigger a stimulus-response circuit, and internal self-
paced intentions and decisions that trigger voluntary circuit
(Haggard, 2008).
OTHER NEUROSCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESES
ON FREE WILL
Beyond Determinism and Consciousness
The concept of free will relevant to our moral and legal,
personal and social practices is much more complex than that
captured by the experiments considered up to now. But here
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what matters are not so much theoretical considerations or
those derived from experimental psychology (such as the role
played in decisions by implementation intentions, which then
re-evaluate the active role of consciousness; Gollwitzer, 1999),
but those that originate from the neuroscientific research itself.
In what might be called a new phase of empirical investigation
on free will, the problem of determinism and the role of
consciousness is left in the background, and the focus goes
to other factors that enter the brain mechanisms of decision-
making, without asking first if those processes (necessarily the
most simple, at least for now) are deterministic or stochastic.
On the other side, neuroscientists are trying to confine the
concept of free will to operationalizable situations, so as to
measure it and be able to identify, at least as a goal, its neural
correlates.
There is a line of research on non-human primates, but
more recently also on humans, which studies fine decision-
making at the neuronal level, bringing it back to a mechanistic
process that might be the neuronal interface of our common
sense descriptions. This trend has been well described by
Roskies (2010a,b, 2013), who is one of the major supporters
of this approach. For example, in Shadlen and Newsome’s
(2001) experiments, monkeys are trained to look at stimuli
consisting of points that move randomly to the right and to
the left and to ‘‘indicate’’ the overall direction of the points.
The monkeys give this indication moving their eyes (with a
saccade) to the right or to the left. What emerges is that
the activity of the neurons of the lateral interparietal (LIP)
area increases with the information in the sensory cells of the
middle temporal (MT) area and upper middle temporal (MST)
area. The discharge rates rise up to reaching a given level,
at which the monkey performs the saccade and the neurons
stop discharging. This is the threshold for a decision to take
place. The time taken to reach the threshold level depends on
the perceptual characteristics of the stimulus (the strength of the
movement over time) and the discharges stop after the answer
was given.
The discharges also depend on whether the monkey is
asked to answer when he wishes, or rather to hold back
the response until the signal is given for the saccade. If the
monkey is asked to wait until the signal is given to respond,
LIP neurons continue to discharge even in the absence of
the visual stimulus (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). According to
Roskies (2010b), this is the discharge scheme of a neuron
involved in the decision-making process; the levels of discharge
can be maintained in the absence of the stimulus, signifying
the independence of the decision from the inputs on which
it operates, and the activity continues until it reaches the
critical level at which the response is generated, or until the
neurons that represent the elements accumulated in favor of a
different choice lead to eye movement. In addition, electrical
stimulation of LIP neurons can influence the monkey’s decision,
indicating that LIP cells causally contribute to the process
that triggers decision and action (Hanks et al., 2006). It
remains, however, to be established whether this role is that
of deliberation that leads to a decision or that of the decision
itself.
The reaction times and the accuracy in the evaluation are
very similar between monkeys and humans, with the probability
of choice and the response time connected in a similar way to
the difficulty of discriminating the stimulus, so that it can be
assumed that also in humans these neural processes are similar.
Amathematical description of the dynamics of this system allows
one to talk about the race towards the critical threshold (Gold
and Shadlen, 2007; Wong et al., 2007). According to this model,
the neuronal populations with specific response properties
represent different ‘‘hypotheses’’. The discharge rates represent
the strength of the evidence in favor of those hypotheses based
on evidence gathered from the environment. When the evidence
for and against each hypothesis is integrated, the discharge rates
reach or move away from the critical level, which represents
the decision point. This is the point at which the animal ‘‘made
a choice’’ about the overall direction of movement. The first
group that reaches this threshold ‘‘wins’’, leading the motor
response.
Schurger et al. (2012) proposed a different interpretation
of the premovement buildup of neuronal activity preceding
voluntary self-initiated movements in humans as well. They used
‘‘a leaky stochastic accumulator to model the neural decision of
‘‘when’’ to move in a task where there is no specific temporal
cue, but only a general imperative to produce a movement
after an unspecified delay on the order of several seconds’’.
According to their model, ‘‘when the imperative to produce a
movement is weak, the precise moment at which the decision
threshold is crossed leading to movement is largely determined
by spontaneous subthreshold fluctuations in neuronal activity.
Time locking to movement onset ensures that these fluctuations
appear in the average as a gradual exponential-looking increase
in neuronal activity’’ (Schurger et al., 2012).
The model proposed by Schurger et al. (2012) accounts for
the behavioral and EEG data recorded from human subjects
performing the task and also makes a specific prediction that was
confirmed in a second electroencephalography experiment: fast
responses to temporally unpredictable interruptions should be
preceded by a slow negative-going voltage deflection beginning
well before the interruption itself, even when the subject was
not preparing to move at that particular moment. The task was
to repeatedly push a button, sometimes at will, sometimes in
response to a sound produced by the experimenters according
to a causal sequence. The speed of response (pressing the
button) when the sound is produced is related to the proximity
to the peak of the background brain activity, which appears
to be random, an ebb and flow that has its highest point in
the threshold at which it produces the decision to push the
button.
According to this explanation, ‘‘the RP does not reflect
processing within a specific action domain. Our finding that
movement does not significantly modulate RP amplitude
supports this aspect of their claim by extending the RP to the
domain of covert decisions’’ (Alexander et al., 2016). Another
consequence is the fact that the neural decision to move at a
specific time happens much later compared to Libet’s hypothesis,
and the RP is only a by-product of a drift diffusion process.
But the RP would still be predictive in that it precedes action
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and conscious awareness of both motor and cognitive action.
However, the RP is predictive with regards the whether and the
when, if a known task is performed, but not with regards to the
what of the action (Brass and Haggard, 2008).
Jo et al. (2013) seems to go in the same direction with
their work: they considered both the positive and the negative
potential shifts in a ‘‘self-initiated movement condition’’ as well
as in a no-movement condition. The comparison of the potential
shifts in different conditions showed that the onset of the RP
appeared to be unchanged. ‘‘This reveals that the apparently
negative RP emerges through an unequal ratio of negative
and positive potential shifts. These results suggest that ongoing
negative shifts of the SCPs facilitate self-initiated movement but
are not related to processes underlying preparation or decision to
act’’ (Jo et al., 2013).
Murakami et al. (2014) confirmed those findings. They
used rats, who had to perform a specific task: wait for a
tone (which was purposely delayed) and decide when to stop
waiting for it. The rats’ neuronal activity of the secondary
M2 was recorded and resulted consistent with the model
of integration-to-bound decision. ‘‘A first population of M2
neurons ramped to a constant threshold at rates proportional
to waiting time, strongly resembling integrator output. A second
population, which they propose provide input to the integrator,
fired in sequences and showed trial-to-trial rate fluctuations
correlated with waiting times’’ (Murakami et al., 2014). Also,
an integration model based on the recorded neuronal activity
in the considered brain areas has allowed the researchers to
quantitatively foresee the inter-neuronal correlations manifested
during the task performance. ‘‘Together, these results reinforce
the generality of the integration-to-bound model of decision-
making. These models identify the initial intention to act as the
moment of threshold crossing while explaining how antecedent
subthreshold neural activity can influence an action without
implying a decision’’ (Murakami et al., 2014).
Schurger et al. (2016) stress that the main new finding about
the brain activity preceding SVM ‘‘is that the apparent build-
up of this activity, up until about 200 ms pre-movement, may
reflect the ebb and flow of background neuronal noise, rather
than the outcome of a specific neural event corresponding
to a ‘‘decision’’ to initiate movement’’. The model used is
the bounded-integration process, ‘‘a computational model of
decision making wherein sensory evidence and internal noise
(both in the form of neural activity) are integrated over time
by one or more decision neurons until a fixed threshold-level
firing rate us reached, at which the animal issues a motor
response. In the case of spontaneous self-initiated movement
there is no sensory evidence, so the process is dominated
by internal noise’’ (Schurger et al., 2016). The stochastic
decision model (SDM) used by Schurger et al. (2012) allowed
them to claim that bounded integration seems to explain
stimulus-response decision as relying on the same neural
decision mechanism used for perceptual decisions and internal
self-paced intention and decision as ‘‘dominated by ongoing
stochastic fluctuations in neural activity that influence the
precise moment at which the decision threshold is reached’’
(Schurger et al., 2016). And this mechanism seems to be
shared with all animals including crayfish (Kagaya and Takahata,
2010).
The philosophical implications could be that ‘‘when one forms
an intention to act, one is significantly disposed to act but not
yet fully committed. The commitment comes when one finally
decides to act. The SDM reveals a remarkably similar picture on
the neuronal level, with the decision to act being a threshold
crossing neural event that is preceded by a neural tendency
toward this event’’ (Schurger et al., 2016).
The Veto Power
Another recent study has brought back to the center of
neuroscientific research the space of autonomy that the subject
seems to have compared to the idea of free will as an illusion
supported by the experiments based on the alleged unconscious
onset of the action. Schultze-Kraft et al. (2016) showed that
people are able to cancel movements after elicitation of RP if
stop signals occur earlier than 200 ms before movement onset.
In the real-time experiment, ‘‘subjects played a game where they
tried to press a button to earn points in a challenge with a
brain–computer interface (BCI) that had been trained to detect
their RPs in real time and to emit stop signals’’ (Schultze-Kraft
et al., 2016).
The subjects had to press with their foot a button on the floor
after a green light flashed: they could so whenever they wanted
after about 2 s. Participants earned points if they pressed the
button before the red light to come back (the stop signal). The
experiment was composed of three phases. In the first phase, the
stop signals were lit at random and themovements of the subjects
were not predicted. In the second phase, the authors used data
taken from the EEG on the participants in the first phase. In this
way a classifier was trained to predict (with imperfect accuracy)
the movements (the When and the Whether, not the What). In
this phase, the BCI could foresee the fact that the subject would
press the button thanks to the detection of the RP and therefore
turned on the red light to earn points against the subject if it
could not stop the movement. In the third phase, the subjects
were informed that the BCI could ‘‘see their preparation of the
movement’’ and they had to try to beat the computer by moving
in an unforeseeable way.
In all phases of the experiment, there was no difference
between RPs. While in the first phase, in 66.5% of the cases,
subjects were winning by pressing the button with the green light
on, in stages two and three trials in which subjects were able to
beat the computer, by not pushing the button with the red light
on, decreased to 31%, and warning participants of the prediction
of the BCI would not help them do any better. The authors
could thus claim that ‘‘despite the stereotypical shape of the RP
and its early onset at around 1000ms before EMG activity, several
aspects of our data suggest that subjects were able to cancel an
upcoming movement until a point of no return was reached
around 200 ms before movement onset. If the stop signal occurs
later than 200 ms before EMG onset, the subject cannot avoid
moving’’ (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016). The explanation of the
minimum threshold of 200 ms could reflect the time necessary
for the stop signal to light up, the subject to perceive it and cancel
the movement that was already being prepared.
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As to which cortical areas are involved in vetoing an
already initiated movement, some studies have tried to identify
them. Brass and Haggard (2007) examined the voluntary
inhibition using an experimental paradigm that was based
on the Libet task. The subjects were asked to press a
button while watching a cursor moving along the face of
a clock. Every time, after pressing the button, the subjects
had to signal the precise moment when they thought they
decided to press the button. In addition, the instructions
specified that the participants had to inhibit the execution of
the response in some tests of their choice. Comparing this
voluntary inhibition condition with the condition in which
the action had not been inhibited, the authors observed an
activation of the dorsal fronto-medial cortex (DFM). This
area is different from the brain regions involved in the stop
signal tasks, in which the inhibition is controlled by external
signals. Furthermore, the DFM cortex is also distinct from
the brain regions controlling the activity linked to the when
and what components of voluntary action. Brass and Haggard
(2007) have interpreted this finding as evidence that there is
a mechanism of voluntary inhibition that can be dissociated,
in neuroanatomo-functional terms, from an ‘‘environmental’’
inhibiting mechanism, which involves the lateral prefrontal
cortex.
This finding was replicated in a subsequent study of Kühn
et al. (2009), in which the subjects had to avoid dropping a
ball sliding down a ramp, by pressing a button before the ball
came down and broke. In some tests of their choice, they could
choose to voluntarily inhibit the response. The comparison of the
condition of voluntary inhibition with the condition of voluntary
action still showed activation of the DFM cortex, supporting the
idea that this area is involved in the inhibition of voluntary action
(Schel et al., 2014).
Finally, Schultze-Kraft et al. (2016) declared to be agnostic
about the interpretation of their data in regards of RP. As
the RP is predictive of the subsequent movement, it could
be read as ‘‘the leaky integration of spontaneous fluctuations
in autocorrelated neural signals’’. Theoretically, the question
remains about the departure of the intention to block the action
while the movement is being prepared, along with the possible
coexistence of two intentions suggested by the commands of
the experimenters. The participants in the experiment, in fact,
want to win against the computer, therefore they want to push
the button, and also have the intention, partly contrasting,
not to push the button when the computer turns the red
light on.
A More Realistic Model
This novel perspective offered by the line of research by Schurger
et al. (2012) here described works on very simple decision-
making processes and could be exposed to the same criticism
in this regard have been made to Libet’s research line. But
Roskies (2010b) has suggested some tracks along which to
develop research on more complex decision-making processes,
close to those relevant to social life. First, one must introduce
the value of the decision, seen as a subjective or moral feature
that drives action. By manipulating the expected rewards for
correct action or for a particular type of decisions, or by
manipulating the probabilities of the outcomes, both the decision
and the activity levels of LIP neurons are altered (Platt and
Glimcher, 1999; Glimcher, 2002; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004;
Sugrue et al., 2004). In this way it is possible to change
the monkey’s choice about the objective of the saccade by
offering her favorite reward. Although it is not known how
the figures are represented, it seems that the Lip neurons can
integrate the information on the value or on the reward in
the decision-making process, and that information has a causal
role.
As for the reasons, and the responsiveness to them, Roskies
(2010b) suggests that also the reasons, albeit discursive and
propositional, may be encoded as information at the neuronal
level. Simplifying, in her view one might think that in a
situation where, say, there is little food and many people,
different populations of neurons represent the content ‘‘I
am hungry’’, while others represent ‘‘others need this more
than I do’’, others ‘‘the weak come first’’ and so forth,
weighing reasons in terms of activation and modulation of
the response of the populations of neurons delegated to
the choice and the final decision. However, such a model
(Dorris and Glimcher, 2004) should be considered as purely
hypothetical because first we do not know what are the
specific populations of neurons, we don’t yet have the
instruments to identify them, and we do not know their
interactions (also considering the recent failures of naturalized
semantics).
Secondly—and perhaps most importantly—it is unclear how
what we externally call ‘‘reasons’’ could be activated and weighed
by the decision-maker understood as a unitary subject or self,
according to the description for which we truly act based on
reasons. In this case, I believe one cannot seek a simple neural
interface for commonsensical concepts and notions. In fact, the
idea of a deep and unitary self—the idea of a conscious subject
controlling her behavior instant by instant—has been strongly
challenged by evidence coming from empirical psychology
and cognitive neuroscience (Dennett, 1991; Metzinger, 2004,
2009). Therefore, one should avoid the temptation to reproduce
such a description in neural levels. But if we trace back the
reasons to populations of neurons in a mechanistic model—if
we trace them back to thresholds—it is not easy to figure
out who makes the decisions and why. If it is true that
some people seem to be more sensitive to specific reasons,
other than those to which other people are sensitive, and if
people can change over time the reasons by which they are
usually motivated, and in certain situations the same people
may not to respond to the reasons to which they are usually
sensitive, one has to wonder if what prevails are processes that
we would call random or that, in any case, are beyond our
control.
Here the role of consciousness seems again to be relevant.
If experiments à la Libet seemed to have ruled it out from
a causal standpoint, the experiment by Schultze-Kraft et al.
(2016) on movement vetoing seems to reassess its role in
blocking the preparation process triggered in the brain. In this
sense, this seems to be a more realistic line of neuroscientific
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investigation on free will, one that contemplates, even in broad
terms, stochastic brain processes, for the most part triggered
by environmental stimuli, which often are not aware of (the
same as our train of thoughts arising spontaneously without
us being able to orientate it from the beginning), but also by
spontaneous activity of the brain (Changeux, 2004; Brembs,
2011) that creates models of reality. ‘‘Learning mechanisms
evolved to permit flexible behavior as a modification of reflexive
behavioral strategies. In order to do so, not one, but multiple
representations and action patterns should be generated by
the brain’’ (De Ridder et al., 2013). And this repertoire is not
infinite. Indeed, ‘‘our evolutionary-evolved brain potential to
generate multiple action plans is constrained by what is stored
in memory and by what is present in the environment’’ (De
Ridder et al., 2013). Schurger and Uithol (2015) also argue
that the ‘‘actions emerge from a causal web in the brain’’ and
that the ‘‘proprioceptive feedback might play a counterintuitive
role in the decision process’’. They, thus recommend the use
of dynamical systems approach for the study of the origins of
voluntary action.
On these spontaneous processes we can exercise control,
which can be considered automatic and unconscious when
evaluated with the classical theoretical criteria of conscious
control. First, there is an innate behavioral repertoire of
provisions linked to survival in the environments within which
we evolved. Secondly, there is a repertoire of behavioral
provisions that is stratified in terms of conscious repetitions
due to environmental stimuli or to internal choices (with all
the limitations that this expression has in reference to the brain
mechanisms analyzed so far) and then becomes automatic. The
control can, however, also be explicit, with obvious limitations
and cases of complete control failure. Based on this complex self-
construction (which has a neural correlates), we are creatures
with a higher or lower degree of free will. This free will may
then be better understood and circumscribed, so as to be more
objectively operationalized and also measured.
OPERAZIONALIZING, MEASURING AND
VERIFYING: FROM THE ACTION TO THE
BRAIN
My view is that a richer conceptualization of free will—one
that is able to overcome the stall of the metaphysical debate
as well as the current difficulties of neuroscience (Nachev and
Hacker, 2014) and empirical psychology (Nahmias, 2014)–has to
be linked to the idea of ‘‘capacity’’. In fact, as claimed by Mecacci
and Haselager (2015), the kind of free will investigated by
neuroscientific experiments, which is self-generated and defined
according to the absence of cues, ‘‘does little justice to the
common sense practice of holding people responsible for their
freely willed actions that consists in asking explanations and
justifications from the actor’’ (Mecacci and Haselager, 2015).
Another important point is that there are differences in time
scales between laboratory tasks (the milliseconds to seconds time
range) and real life or, better, life as we measure it temporally
(seconds, minutes, hours, weeks, years) regarding decisions that
really concern us. Even if the underlying mechanism might be
the same, the experiments described so far cannot investigate
whether decisions with a longer maturation process are free and
to what extent they are such. It might be possible to distinguish
between proximal and distal mechanisms, but this doesn’t seem
feasible lacking the tools to address decisions involving longer
time scales. For this reason it might be useful to introduce
other and different ways to conceptualize and operationalize
(supposedly) free actions.
‘‘By capacity, in the context of free will, we mean the
availability of a repertoire of general skills that can be
manifested and used without the moment by moment conscious
control that is required by the second condition of free will
we have previously seen’’ (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015). The
concept of capacity is related to that of internal control,
understood as the agent’s ‘‘ownership’’ of the mechanism that
triggers the relevant behavior and the reasons-responsiveness
of that mechanism (Fischer and Ravizza, 2000). And reasons-
responsiveness must involve a coherent pattern of reasons-
recognition. ‘‘More specifically, it must involve a pattern of actual
and hypothetical recognition of reasons that is understandable
by some appropriate external observer. And the pattern must
be at least minimally grounded in reality’’ (Lavazza and
Inglese, 2015). The concept of capacity used in this sense,
and combined with the idea of reasons-responsiveness, also
avoids the objection of determinism that has always weighed
on the debate on free will. From a philosophical point of view,
the approach related to capacity may fall indeed in the strand
of so-called compatibilism, which defends the fact that human
freedom can exist even if determinism is true of the physical
world.
Cognitive abilities might be firstly operationalized as a set of
neuropsychological tests, which can be used to operationalize
and measure specific executive functions, as they are strongly
linked to the concept of control. Executive functions, also
known as control functions, are essential to organize and
plan everyday behavior—which is not the instant behavior
found in Libet’s experiments. Those skills are necessary to
perform the greater part of our goal-oriented actions. They
allow us to modulate our behavior, control its development
and change it according to the environmental stimuli (the
environment being both physical and social). Also, executive
functions allow us to change our behavior based on it effects,
with a sophisticated feedback mechanism; finally, they are also
necessary for tasks of abstraction, inventiveness and judgment.
Those who, for whatever reason, have a deficit in their
executive functions cannot respond to their social environment
appropriately, and struggle to plan their behavior or to choose
between alternatives based on their judgment or interest.
Sufferers of these deficits in executive functions often fail to
control their instinctive responses and to modify their regular
courses of action, or are unable to concentrate or persist in
the pursuit of a goal (Barkley, 2012; Goldstein and Naglieri,
2014).
In general terms, the executive functions refer to the set of
mental processes necessary for the development of cognitive-
behavioral patterns adaptive in response to new and demanding
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environmental conditions. The domain of executive functions
includes (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015):
• the ability of planning and evaluation of effective strategies in
relation to a specific purpose related to the skills of problem-
solving and cognitive flexibility.
• inhibitory control and decision-making processes that support
the selection of functional response and the modification of
the response (behavior) in relation to changing environmental
contingencies.
• attentional control referred to the ability to inhibit interfering
stimuli and to activate the relevant information.
• working memory referring to the cognitive mechanisms that
can maintain online and manipulate information necessary to
perform complex cognitive tasks.
• (and it can be added with regards to free will) creativity and
the ability to cope with environmental changes through novel
solutions.
Those of empirical psychology are higher order concepts,
which act as a bridge between free will, which is something
that is not in the brain but can be observed in behavior (along
with its causes), and the underlying brain processes. It has been
convincingly suggested that in the construction of a hierarchy of
mechanisms and explanations (Craver, 2007), also to guide the
exploration, one must go from inside to outside and from outside
to inside. One goes from measurable skills to their brain basis,
and from the tentative index of free will to the underlying (real)
mechanisms.
Based on the evidence presented, I believe that a viable
proposal is to construct an index related to compatible tests
whose relevance can be uniformly ascertained. It would be a
kind of IQ-like profile that would allow for the operationalization
and quantification of a person’s cognitive skills. All the tests used
(for example, Stroop Test, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Weigl’s
Color-Form Sorting Test, Go-No Go Test) should be related to
the subject’s age and education and then transformed in new
standardized scores (Equivalent Scores, ES) on an ordinal scale,
e. g. ranging from 0 to 4, with 0 representing scores below cut-off
point and 4 representing scores equal to or better than average.
Specific standardized scores exist in many countries or linguistic
areas. The subjects would get for each test a raw score (or RS),
given by the sum of the scores obtained in each item that makes
up the test, which would then be standardized.
A synthetic index such as the one here proposed measures
a certain range of cognitive and behavioral control skills that
configure a certain kind of free will at the psychological-
functional level. These are potential capacities measured with
standardized instruments in laboratory situations, which do not
consider any other factors that may restrict the freedom of a
subject in specific situations, such as those that are relevant in
moral scenarios and legal contexts. The same goes for moral
judgment. However, an index such as the one I’m proposing
here could be the first step, albeit certainly imperfect, towards
more objective measures to discriminate between people who
have more or less ‘‘free will’’ or, in other words, are more or
less capable of self-control and rational choice (i.e., a reasons-
responsive choice).
This hypothesis would be in line with the proposals of
operationalizing free will advanced so far. According to Vohs
(2010), freedom might be conceived of as the sum of executive
functions and goal-directed, future-oriented behaviors, which
include rational choice, planning, intelligent thought, and
self-control. Free will can be then constituted by a limited stock
of energy, devoted to guiding executive functioning processes.
The free will index I am proposing is also consistent with
Baumeister’s contribution:
Psychologists should focus on what we do best: collecting
evidence about measurable variance in behaviors and inner
processes and identifying consistent patterns in them. With free
will, it seems most productive for psychologists to start with
the well-documented observation that some acts are freer than
others. As already noted, dissonance, reactance, coping with
stress, and other behaviors have been shown in the laboratory
to depend on variations in freedom and choice. Hence, it is
only necessary to assume that there are genuine phenomena
behind those subjective and objective differences in freedom. In
a nutshell, we should explain what happens differently between
free and unfree actions (Baumeister, 2008).
Empirical research on how human beings work has recently
focused on self-control as a feature of free will. Self-control
can be defined as the exertion of willpower on behavior. Self-
control is thus generally regarded as the capacity to override
inappropriate impulses and automatic or habitual responses and
to suppress or delay immediate gratification so as to reach a long-
term goal (Gailliot and Baumeister, 2007). ‘‘Being in control’’
includes the capacity to maintain goals, to balance long- and
short-term values, to consider and evaluate the consequences of
a planned action, and to resist being ‘‘carried away by emotion’’
(Churchland, 2006). Self-control can also be regarded as the
ability of higher-order functions to modulate the activity of
lower-level functions, where higher-order functions manifest
themselves externally in complex behavior, adjusted according
to the environmental needs, while lower-level functions are
manifested in simple and stereotyped behaviors, not adjusted
according to the demands of the environment (Roskies, 2010a).
Everyone exhibits a different degree of self-control compared to
other individuals, and for each person the degree of self-control
varies over time (Baumeister et al., 2006; Casey et al., 2011; Dang
et al., 2015). The variability of self-control that is manifested
in behavior and can be measured with the test has its base in
neuronal functioning, which in turn depends on education and
habits, external circumstances and the internal neuronal noise.
However, two executive functions turn out to be central:
(i) the ability to predict the future outcomes of a given action;
and (ii) the ability to suppress inappropriate, i.e., not sufficiently
valuable, actions. Importantly, these two executive functions
operate not only during the genesis of an action, but also during
the planning of an already selected action. In fact, during the
temporal gap between the time when an action has been chosen
and the moment when the motor output is going to be generated,
the context might have changed, altering the computed value of
the action and thus requiring a radical change of the planned
motor strategy (Mirabella, 2014).
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It seems that the peculiarity of our freedom at the cognitive
level is the ability to modulate or block courses of action that
environmental stimuli automatically or unconsciously arouse
in us—a reproposal in different form of Libet’s free won’t
and Schultze-Kraft’s vetoing. These psychological-functional
indicators must then lead to their cerebral bases. For instance,
one can consider a situation in which one’s needs are satisfied
(or not) and the consequent motivation to act based on the
evaluation process of the need satisfaction.
This is an essential process and one that is continuously
performed by our motor system. In fact, in most places where
we live, if not all, we are surrounded by tools whose sight
automatically activates motor schemas that would normally
be employed to interact with those objects. These actions
are prompted by the features of the objects, the so-called
affordances (Gibson, 1979). It has been shown that even the
simple observation of pictures depicting affordable objects (such
as graspable objects) activates a sub-region of the medial
frontal cortex, the SMA, even when there is no requirement
to actually act on those stimuli (Grèzes and Decety, 2002).
These stimulus-driven activations are rapid, involuntary, and
unconscious (Mirabella, 2014).
Environmental stimuli, in this case, can induce a subject to
make specific choices through a priming process that exploits
our action tendencies. Typically, individuals are able to control
their behavior, but in some cases they fail to do so; for example if
suffering from microlesions of the SMA, people have a tendency
to invariably implement a certain type of action, even if the
environment, both physical and social, does not require it
(Sumner et al., 2007). In fact, ‘‘the suppression of a triggered
action might be seen not as an active process, but rather as an
automatic consequence of the evaluative procedure’’ (Mirabella,
2014). One could then say that those who have the ability to better
monitor, control and direct their own behavior are ‘‘freerer’’
than those who do not have this capability. Individuals affected
by disorders of the executive functions are not able to grasp
and process environmental stimuli to direct their behavior. For
example, these people may not be able to stop the utilization
behavior, an automatic mechanism that tends to make us interact
with all the objects that are in our perceptual sphere.
Churchland (2006) and Suhler and Churchland (2009)
proposed a hypothesis concerning the neural basis for control,
which can bridge the gap between higher-order concepts and
brain mechanisms. As she wrote,
Perhaps we can identify various parameters of the normal profile
of being in control, which would include specific connectivity
patterns between amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, and insula,
between anterior cingulate gyrus and prefrontal cortex, and so
forth. Other parameters would identify, for each of the six non
specific systems [identified via the neurotransmitter secreted at
the axon terminals: serotonin, dopamine, norepinephrine,
epinephrine, histamine and acetylcholine], the normal
distribution of axon terminals and the normal patterns of
neurotransmitter release, uptake, and co-localization with other
neurotransmitters such as glutamate. Levels of various hormones
would specify another set of parameters. Yet other parameters
contrast the immature with adult pattern of synaptic density and
axon myelinization. At the current stage of neuroscience, we can
identify the normal range for these parameters only roughly, not
precisely (Churchland, 2006).
This hypothesis would allow for specific brain correlates
of a free will index based on the executive functions-guided
self-control and even, hypothetically, a direct brain measure of
being in control For example, a recent study (Bartelle et al.,
2016) highlights the possibility of having MRI imaging of
dopamine release thanks to a engineered protein that binds to
the neurotransmitter and works as a MRI-visible probe. As the
authors put it, ‘‘one could imagine a future in which molecular
fMRI is used to determine brain-wide neurochemicals maps
corresponding to a universe of stimuli and behavioral programs’’.
Even though one should always consider that there isn’t perfect
correspondence between higher-order concepts and putative
neural correlates.
In particular, one must consider that what matters in
interpersonal relations and in law, to give two examples
of practical relevance of free will, is freedom as actually
performed: that is, freedom as it can be observed and with some
approximation, also measured through a series of psychological
tests. This does not mean that the same level of freedom
manifested in behavior matches the same level of activation of
the related brain areas. However, one can investigate the brain
causes of ‘‘freedom deficit’’ compared with the average shown by
relevant samples of the population, and so come to a progressive
refinement of the research on the neural bases of free will.
Another example is given by the investigation of the role
of the cholinergic interneurons in behavioral flexibility (Aoki
et al., 2015). This class of neurons seem to be connected to
survive in an ever-changing world, which requires behaving
flexibly. Flexibility can be assessed (andmeasured) at a behavioral
level, but cerebral mechanisms remain largely unknown. Using
conventional tests on behavioral flexibility, which require
animals to shift their attention from one stimulus property (e.g.,
color) to another (e.g., shape), researchers probed the effects of
an immunotoxin-induced lesion of cholinergic interneurons in
the striatum.
A selective cholinergic ablation was made by means of
injections of immunotoxin, which targeted neurons containing
choline acetyltransferase in the dorsomedial or ventral striatum.
A control group was instead injected with saline. ‘‘When
encountering a change of behavioral rules after the set-shift,
either lesion made animals stick to a previously correct but
now invalid response strategy. They also showed less exploratory
behavior toward finding a new rule. Most interestingly, ablation
of cholinergic neurons in the dorsomedial striatum impaired a
shift of set when it required attention to a previously irrelevant
cue. On the other hand, ventral cholinergic lesions had an effect
on a shift in which a novel stimulus was introduced as a new
directional cue’’ (Aoki et al., 2015). Animals thus can be taken to
be ‘‘less free’’ when striatal cholinergic interneurons don’t work
properly.
This last example serves to indicate how to bridge the gap
between overt behaviors (to which we tend to attribute the
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property of freedom) with neuronal mechanisms that are clearly
identifiable and even manipulable. In fact, it is not so important
to look at the conscious aspect of a single proximal mechanism,
but rather to consider the manifest behavioral effect that the
considered mechanism helps to produce. This way there would
be a paradigm shift with respect to the neuroscience research
on free will, which seems to have long been too closely linked
to the falsification of the theoretical assumption that an action
is free only if it has a beginning that is fully controlled by a
conscious process. The proposal, I am making here has only the
ambition to be a potentially helpful contribution to theoretical
debate and empirical research, although its limits are very clear.
First, it focuses on a specific part of what is intuitively called ‘‘free
will’’, relating it to the idea of ‘‘capacity’’. Second, it proposes to
measure free will at a psychological level by means of a unitary
index that inevitably misses many nuances of the notion and
the relative capacity. Furthermore, the search for the neural
correlated of such capacities implies not only the identification of
causal mechanisms, but also the consideration of many cerebral
areas. All of this makes things harder compared to approaches
à la Libet. Nevertheless, there is manifest advantage: there is a
greater degree of realism and adherence to the actual behavioral
manifestation of what we call ‘‘free will’’.
CONCLUSION
Free will is an elusive but crucial concept. For many years
we have known that the functioning of our brain has to do
not only with the belief that we have free will but also with
the existence of free will itself. Evidence of the unconscious
start of movement, highlighted by the RP signal, has led to
believe that we had reached an experimental proof of the
non-existence of free will—which many already claimed at a
theoretical level based on the argument of the incompatibility
between determinism and freedom. Along with other evidence
provided by experimental psychology, the branch of studies
inaugurated by Libet has contributed to seeing free will as an
illusion: this view seemed to be reliably supported by science, and
in particular by neuroscience. Recent studies, however, seem to
question this paradigm, which sees the initiation and conscious
control of the action as the first requirement of free will, allegedly
proving that there are no such things.
The stochastic models and the models of evidence
accumulation consider decision as the crossing of a threshold of
activity in specific brain regions. They do not restore the idea of
conscious control but turn away from the previous paradigm.
These studies cannot yet fully explain how the intention to
perform an action arises in the brain, but they better account
for the complexity of the process. In particular, they recognize
the role of the spontaneous activity of the brain, of external cues
and other factors—including those that might be called ‘‘will’’
and ‘‘reasons’’ (which, however, do not currently have precisely
identified neural correlates)—in reaching the critical threshold.
Studies that show how we can consciously block movements
whose preparation has already begun unconsciously, then,
indicate how the subject is able to exercise a form of control,
whose genesis however is still unclear.
One could state that free ‘‘decision-making draws upon
a rich history of accumulated information, manifested in
preferences, attitudes and motivations, and is related to the
current internal and external environment in which we act.
Complete absence of context is impossible’’ (Bode et al.,
2014). In this framework, I have here proposed to integrate
neuroscientific research on free will by connecting higher-level
concepts with their neural correlates through a psychological
operationalization in terms of skills and cognitive functions
that do not necessarily imply a continuous conscious control
over the decision-making and action process. This may also
allow one to create a quantitative index, albeit still quite
rudimentary, of the degree of freedom of each subject. This
freedom would be specifically defined and therefore may not
perfectly coincide with the intuitive concept of free will. Starting
from these functional indicators, which psychology has well
clarified, one could thenmove on to investigate the precise neural
correlates for a different and (possibly)more fundamental level of
explanation in terms of brain processes that enable the executive
functions.
According to Craver (2007), a mechanistic explanation is
able to lead to an inter-field integration. There are two relevant
aspects to this approach. The functional knowledge that can
be drawn from psychological research is a tool to identify
neural mechanisms; the knowledge of the brain structure can
guide the construction of far more sophisticated psychological
models (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999). The index of free will
that I am proposing (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015)—despite surely
needing further refinement—might be useful to explore the brain
mechanisms that underlie what appears in behavior as ‘‘free
will’’, which no longer seems to be an illusion, not even for
neuroscientific research.
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